In this paper we examine the issue of gains from trade in a setting which admits urban unemployment and a variety of urban, labour market conditions. In addition to the conventional criterion, we also consider the case when the size of the urban unemployed is the sole determinant of welfare. The results lean heavily on factor market stability and are sensitive to the commodity being imported and to the assumption of intersectoral mobility of capital.
In the decade since the publication of Harris-Todaro's paper [16] , various aspects of the structure of labour markets in LDCs have been formalized and incorporated into a well-articulated, two -sector production model.! Capital has generally been treated as non-shiftable2 between the two sectors but recent works have also considered the long run and assumed it to be intersectorally mobile.3 However, the primary focus of all of this literature has been on urban wage subsidies and both the positive and the normative aspects of these have been intensively studied. There has been a corresponding neglect of a more traditional question in trade theory; namely, whether economies with such labour market distortions gain from trade? Presumably this neglect is in part due to the following two propositions of Bhagwati [3; 4] . 1 . Growth may be immiserizingfor economies with factor market distortions.4 * The authors are Professors in the Department of Political Economy, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218. They thank T. Datta-Chaudhuri and T. Hatta for encouragement and several helpful suggestions. Responsibility for errors is assumed by the authors alone. !This has also been referred to as the segmentation model of unemployment; see the introduction in Sabot (1978) .
2It is worth reminding the reader that non-shiftable capital can be alternatively viewed as two different factors, say, rural land and urban capital. On non-shiftable capital, we have, in addition to the work of Harris-Todaro, the investigations of Bhagwati-Srinivasan [7; 8] , Stiglitz [34; 35; 36] , Corden [13, , , , Calvo [11] , Hazari [17, Chapter 7] and Khan [25] .
3In the context of intersectoral capital mobility, we have the work of Corden-Findlay [14], Khan [23; 24] , Neary [29] and Stiglitz [36] .
4This isjust a corollary of Proposition 4 in Bhagwati [3, p. 81].
2. No-trade and free-trade policies are conceptually the. same as pre-growth and post-growth situations. [As such] , the theory of immiserizinggrowth can be used to illuminate, and prove, other propositions of trade theory where no growth, in an obvious sense, is involved.s intervene in domestic labour markets and which must rely solely on tariffĩ s worth pointing out in this connection that throughout this paper, wec onfming our attention to a small country which must take the internatio as given. Thus, our sub-optimal tariff formulae are obviously of a differ~t h.. th, optimol,.riff fmmul. fm . ooon"y withmonopolypow" ill '<ade &, Ie
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and~\.~al .ysout th, ,qn.tiom which." b.oe '0 the snb"q",n' .nolys~. S"tio.\ ..
. pr form the core of the paper; the former assumesthat capital ISintersectoral11i\ '\ and the latter that it is non-shiftabl~. Section 5 is a brief discuSsionof rela. '\\ . ge and Section 6 concludes the paper wIth a summary.~\~tio I. THE GENERALIZED HARRIS-TODARO MODEL~W e shall be working with the generalized Harris-Todaro mOdelwhich \V a variety of labour market specifications emphasized in the literature. suc~~.
is based on Khan [24; 25] . \\"
Let a country consist of an urban and a rural sector, indexed by , ;;.. respectively, and let it be endowed with non-negative amounts oflabour, \.. \\ral capital, %.
Let the ith sector produce a commodity in amOunt X. in ac~''Q with a production function We thus seem to have a readily available answer to our question as to whether the policies of free trade and no trade can be ranked uniquely in LDCssuffering from the Harris-Todaro type of distortions. Indeed, one can go further and show that for such economiesmore restricted trade cannot be ranked uniquely vis-a-vis less restricted trade. This rests on a third proposition of Bhagwati [3] .
3. Reductions in the "degree" of a distortion will not necessarily be welfare-increasing if there is another distortion in the system.6
However, reduction of urban unemployment is an important policy objective of LDC governments and the question of gains from trade has typically been studied in models with full employment of labour. 7 Thus, despite Bhagwati's propositions, it seems desirable to take another look at the gains-from-trade question in the context of a social welfare function with urban unemployment as the sole determinant. We do this in this paper.
Furthermore, we would say that additional analysis is warranted even in the context of traditional social welfare functions. In an earlier paper, one of us showed that growth can never be imrniserizingwith intersectoral capital mobility and with the various theories of urban wage determination as have been studied in the Harris-Todaro literature; see Khan [26] . Such a result argues for a further scrutiny of the gains-from-trade question in the Harris-Todaro setting. In any case, the question is important enough that it is desirable to have sharper results than can be deduced from Bhagwati's fundamental propositions. To provide such necessary and sufficient conditions is the principal object of this paper. A secondary object is to see what light the assumption of factor market stability sheds on these necessary and sufficient conditions. To our knowledge, such considerations have previously not been brought to bear on the gains-from-trade question. Our results in this regard are more encouraging than the corresponding ones for the wage differential models.8
A useful by-product of our investigation is that we obtain formulae for suboptimal or second -best tariffs. These are of relevance to governments which cannot which is assumed to be positively homogeneou~of degree where :\ is the ratio of the unemployed to the urban employed. Thus L Il u 1.\ 9 As is well known, the question of sub-optimal tariffs was first raised by Ke~\ can be taken to be the probability of finding a job in the urban sector, a formalization due to . Unlike them, however, we shall allow the possibility of the urban wage being endogenously determined. In the mobile capital case this endogeneity is brought out by (1.4a) Wu = n (Wr,i\,R,y) and in the immobile capital case by
where Y is a shift parameter. For a discussion of the microfoundations of (1.4a and lAb), see Khan [25 and 26 respectively] . There it is shown that specializations of the n (0) functions yield not only the original Harris-Todaro rigid wage setting studied further by Bhagwati-Srinivasan,Corden -Findlay, Stiglitz10 and others, but also allow us to incorporate considerations arising from labour-turnover as in Akerlof-Stiglitz [1] , and Stiglitz [34] , or the efficiency wage as in Stiglitz [35] , or the presence of trade-unions as in Calvo [11] , or from costly supervision as in Calvo-Welliszsee Calvo [10] .11 Addition of the following two equations completes the specification of the model in the mobile capital case. For the immobile capital case, the first equation in (1.5) has no meaning.
PRELIMINARYANALYSISOF THE PROBLEM
The following classical propositions relate to the commercial policies and questions we shall pursue in the sequel.
(1) (2) Superiority of free trade to autarchy; Samuelson [31] . Optimality of free trade for a country with no monopoly power in trade; Samuelson [31] .
Desirability of terms -of -trade improvement; Krueger -Sonnenschein [27] .
Superiority of less restricted trade over more restricted trade; Kemp [21] , and Bhagwatiand Kemp [5] .
(3) (4) 10The reference to Stiglitz is his forthcoming piece in the Sabot volume [30J. For the work of the other authors, see the references listed in footnotes 3 and 4. 11By rewriting (1.3) as Wu = T (wr) (l+i\)w where T (0) a shift function, the model also yields the traditional absolute or proportional wage~differential models as a special case. We shall not pursue this here.
Sub-optimal Tariff Policy

(5)
Existence of an optimal tariff in the presence of domestic distortions; Kemp and Negishi [22] ,and Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan [6] .
We shall be analyzing these commercial policies in terms of two welfare functions. The first is simply
The second is the more traditional
where C. is the domestic consumption of commodity i. In the remainder of this I section, we shall show that an analysis of the social welfare function, U, also reduces to the analysis of changesin the rate of urban unemployment, i\. This can be seen most simply by working with the minumum expenditure function rather than with U (0). Let g(Pr' Pu' U) be the minimum expenditure at the prices Pr' Pu required to attain the level of social welfare given by U. It is well known (see, for example, the expository paper of Gorman [15] ), that g is (i) positively homogeneous of degree one in prices; (ii) concave function of the prices; and (iii) such that g. == ag(0)/ap. = C., i = u, r. Now let u be the im p orted com-I I I modity and t the tariff rate. Then the following equation is basic for the analysisof tariff policy of a "small" economy.
(2.2) g(Pr' Pu (1+t), U) = PrXr + Pu (I+t)Xu + p~(gu -Xu) " Equation (2.2) represents the national expenditure/national income identity with the third term on the right hand side obviously being the tariff revenue. Differentiating (2.2) with respect to t and noting that where go is the inverse of the marginal utility of income and m is the marginal propensity to consume the imported commodity. It is well known that positivity of the term (I-(mt/1+t» is precisely the condition for international commodity markets to be stable when the terms of trade are given; see Kemp [21] and Bhagwati and Kemp [5] . Weshall assume this to be so in MAli Khan and Po-Sheng Lin Sub-optimal Tariff Policy 111 the sequel. Thus, the analysis of the propositions listed above reduces to evaluation of the sign of the term au/at. Givenconcavity assumptions,12 the substitution term is negative and we are reduced to an analysis of the price-output response aXuiapu (1+t) and the unemployment rate response aA/at. However, if we denote the compensated (constant utility) price elasticity of urban imports by Eu' equation (2.4) can be manipulated to yield13~(
Thus, an increase in the tariff rate on urban imports leads to an increase in welfare if and only if
THE SETTING WITHINTERSECTORALLY MOBILECAPITAL
In this section we present results on gains from trade when capital is intersectorally mobile. These results are developed in three steps. Firstly, we consider the effect of tariffs and terms of trade changes on urban employment. Secondly, we recall a result on a characterization of dynamic stability in factor markets. Finally, we piece these steps together in terms of the analysis presented in Section 2. The results on the effects of tariffs on urban employment may be of independent interest.
The Effect of a Tariff on Urban Employment
One of the points emerging from Khan [24] , is that the generalized Harris-Todaro model with capital mobility shares the essential properties of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. It is well known that in such a model, the effect of a tariff on wagesand rents depends on factor intensities, i.e., on Unlike the HOS setting, the asymmetric role of the urban and rural sectors calls for a modification of (2.6) when the rural commodity is being imported.14 The reader can check for himself that an increase in the tariffrate on rural imports leads to an increasein welfare if and only if
where (Jij is the share of the jth factor in the value of ith sector output. Now, given the labour market equilibrium condition Analysis of terms -of -trade changes involves no tariffs and in this case, the analogue of (2.4) is to the effects of tariffs on rural wages and rentals. Exploiting the resemblance to the HOS model, such effects also depend on factor intensity conditions provided these are suitably interpreted. Weturn to this.
(Jij can be alternatively and more usefully viewed as the proportional change in the cost of production of the ith commodity for a cet. par. proportional change in the price of the jth factor. Thus all we need to do in our generalized setting is to calculate such changes in the various costs of production by allowing for the fact that wu is not being changed directly but as a result of changesin wr' R and A. 12The reader should be reminded that a strictly concave function does not imply that its second derivative is negative everywhere. We shall ignore this pathological possibility here. 13Henceforth xdenotes dx/x except for A and i i which are respectively given by dA/ (1 +A) and dt/l +tj" This latter modification is required to admit cases when A or ti may be zero.
Furthermore, (JiL is the share of labour in the ith sector, i = u, r.
14This is of course not in contrast to the differential wage models, see Batra 
and causes corresponding changes in the. urban wage and urban costs of production.
Putting these two effects together, we obtain the recalculated°uL' henceforth O~L' to be 0 e (1-e) . 0
Analogous reasoning yields a recalculated 0uK' Here, in addition to the direct effect 0uK' there are two indirect effects. Both of these involveinduced changes in the urban wage; the first is the direct change eR and the second stems from the adjustmentin 'A requiredto maintain(3.1.2),Le., eR/ (e'A-1). Puttingallof these together, we obtain, We can now obtain the correct analogue of (3.1.1) in the Harris-Todaro set-up. This is given by where 91is the size of the urban unemployed. Two final remarks. There is an implicit assumption in these formulae that when changes in ti are being considered, the ith commodity is being imported and that tj is zero. Secondly, it is obvious that formulae (3.1.9) remain the same when changes in Pi rather than ti are being considered.
= Sign [O~K8rL -O~LerK] = Sign frL{OuK (I-ell.) + OULeR}~OrK{euL (ell. -ew}J So far we have been considering changes in the unemployment rate and hence focussed on the Stolper-Samuelson property of the model. As an inspection of (2.4) makes clear, we also need to consider the price-output responses. Again, drawing on the analogy with the HOS model, or rather its varient as in Jones [18] , we need analogues of physical factor intensities in addition to the value intensities of (3.1.1). These are straightforward. Our model exhibits a version of the Rybczynski property15 in that the factor intensity pertaining to the urban sector has to be calculated inclusive of the unemployed labour force. Thus, the effect on outputs of eel. par. changesin factor endowments depend on the sign of (3.1.6a) Sign I~I (3;1.6b)
A result on Dynamic Stability in Factor Markets
In this section we recall a result on the characterization of dynamic stability in factor markets. The underlying adjustment processgis defmed by the following differential equations. [23] . Equations (3.1.9c) follow from equations (3.3.1) in Khan [23] . Indeed, Sections 2 and 3 in Khan [23] can be seen as a mathematical appendix to Section 3.1 of this paper. 15See Khan [24] .
Sign (IDI x 1.:11)> 0 3.4 Results on Gains from Trade in Terms of U . We now consider the case when social welfare is a concavefunction of domestic consumption. Our first result pertains to changes in the terms of trade. Let 'Y-be the ratio of domestic consumption to domestic production of commodity i. 1 Then (2.9) and (3.1.9) yield Such a process has been discussed by Khan [23] and he has shown17
Theorem 3.2.1. Let 101 =1=0, 1.:11 =1=0 at a particular equilibrium. Then local asymptotic stability of such an equilibrium implies that Such a result is very much in the same spirit as Neary's [28] result on the characterization of factor market stability in differential wage models. There he has shown that stability of equilibrium of a particular adjustment process is equivalent to the requirement that physical factor intensities coincide with value intensities in their ranking of the two sectors. In keeping with our emphasis on the resemblance of our model to the HOS model, we obtain a similar result provided we work with employment adjusted and elasticities adjusted intensities, Le., D and .:1of equations (3. This is always fulfilled. Indeed, we can go beyond the rigid wage setting to say that with eX = 0, with the urban commodity being imported, improvements in the terms of trade always cause an improvement in welfare.
A fmal remark. The word optimal is being used in a second best sense and specifically with regard to the policy being considered, Le., a tariff on imports. Indeed, if subsidies are allqwed, then imports of the urban commodity should be subsidized.
Remark 3.4.3. If ew = 1 and eR = 0 as in the HOS model or as in the trade union setting of Calvo [11] , (3.4.1) and (3.4.2) respectively reduce to the requirement that rand r exceed unity. This is always fulfilled. u r We now consider the desirability of tariffs when the economy is initially in a laissez-faire equilibrium. Then (2.4) reduces to 17This is half of Theorem 5.1 in Khan [23J. There, he has shown that (I DI x 1.:11)>0 is necessary and sufficient for dynamic stability under conditions on the elasticities ew' eR and eX' It is easy to check that the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 is independent of these elasticities.
Sign (3U/3t) = -Sign (X/ t) and equations (3.1.9) yield 116 M. Ali Khan and Po-Sheng Un Sub-optimal In this section we reconsider the results of Section 3 in the context of immobile capital. The organization of this section is identical to that of Section 3. It is worth mentioning, however, that dynamic' stability conditions do not playas prominent a role.
Remark 3.4.7. In the rigid-wage setting, eR = ew =°and hence there always exists a welfare-improving tariff on rural imports and never on urban imports. Our final result of this subsection concerns sub-optimal tariffs and the superiority of less-restricted trade to more-restricted trade. Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (3.1.9) yield
The Effect of a Tariff on Urban Unemployment
We begin this subsection with the observation that the generalized Harris-Todaro model with immobile capital shares essential properties of the Ricardo-Viner model.l9 It is well known20 that the analysis of such a model reduces to Khan and Po-Sheng Lin Sub-optimal as discussed under (3.1.4). In the third row of the matrix in (4.1.1), the only chan ges are that Q is measured inclusive of urban unemployment, Le., L u u (1 + A);rb1and that -l:Q.a., the aggregate elasticity of labour demand, is given by ;:z;. eA-1 The first term needs no ex planation. Q a is the cet. par. change in the demand for u u urban labour when the urban wage changes and it has to be corrected for the fact that we are considering rural wage changes. The correction is the same as the one in (4.1.2) or (3.1.4). The last term pertains to AIv.r' Le., the change in the unemployment rate and this has also been discussedearlier under (3.1.3).
We can now calculate chan ges in R. and w , and hence A, for corresponding I r changes in p.. However, at this point a natural question arises as to why we do not I exploit this resemblance with the Ricardo -Viner model even further and merely substitute the modified entries (4.1.2) and (4.1.3) in the solutions calculated, say, by Jones [19] . The reason is that these solutions for the Ricardo-Viner model crucially rely on the fact that the first two rows of the matrix sum to unity and the last sums to zero. Our reformulated matrix loses both of these properties. By routine calculations, we can accordingly derive21
Theorem 4.2.1. Let eA < 1 at a particular equilibrium. Then local asymptotic stability of such an equilibrium implies that 11> O.
It is worth emphasizing that it is not true that asymptotic stability of a particular equilibrium in terms of the adjustment process!fi implies that ew~1.
Results on Gains from Trade in Terms of W
We are now ready to address the question of gains from trade. Weshall assume throughout this subsection that the followinghypothesis is satisfied at equilibrium.
Assumption E. eA~0 and 0~ew~1
This is really an innocuous assumption24 in the light of previous work; see Khan [25] . Wecan now state (4.1.4a) Alii =Qi17i (1 - 23.This is half of Proposition 3.3. in Khat) [25] . There he has also shown that eA "50 and ew '5 lImply that an equilibrium of .9l!is locally, asymptotically stable.
24The only settings known to us for which e may be greater than one are those discussed by Calvo [10; 11] . However, Calvo [11] assum~s a Cobb-Douglas technology in the urban sector which does imply e < 1. Thus the possibility e > I rests on more general technologies.
In any case, a sufficient1;huge value of e implies inftability of equilibrium in factor markets under the process discussed in Khan [23] ; s~e footnote 23. 21These routine calculations are available on request. The reader should note, however, that we abuse notation by using 11for two different expressions. No confusion should result. Next, we consider the question of the existence of welfare-improving tariffs when the economy is initially in a position of laissez-faire. Our fmal result of this sub section concerns sub-optimal tariffs and the superiority of less-restricted trade to more-restricted trade. Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (4. * Remark 4.4.3. If ew = 1, then ti = 0 and less-restricted trade is always superior to more restricted trade. This is an alternative statement of Proposition 4.4.2 but it does not depend on' factor market stability. Finally, Remark 3.4.10 is also relevant here. are the only authors to have discussed tariffs in the context of intersectoral capital mobility. Their brief discussion26 focusses on the importance of changes in the unemployment rate as the crucial determinant of the welfare-effect of tariffs. They write, "Tariffs. . . may fail to raise net output at world prices because the rise in manufacturing output may be offset by a greater fall in agricultural output owing to the extra unemployment created." The results presented in this paper can be viewed as an extension and a sharpening of their basic statement. Thus in terms of the welfare function W, trade is always beneficial when the urban commodity is being imported and never so when the rural commodity is being imported, see Proposition 3.3.1. This statement is conditioned on factor markets being dynamically stable which reduces in this context, to the requirement that the urban sector is capital intensive in employment adjusted terms; see Khan [23] and Neary [29] . In terms of the welfare function D, changes in the terms of trade are studied in Remark 3.4.2; existence of welfare-improving tariffs in Remark 3.4.7; and sub-optimal tariffs in Proposition 3.4.3. These now take the simple forms * tu 1 + t* u = (---s)(J-) (k (~r+ X) ) "Iu u u t* r
RELATIONSIDPWITHOTHER WORK
In the context of intersectorally in1mobilecapital, Bhagwatiand Srinivasan [7] "investigate optimality properties of alternative policies in regard to their effects on employment levels [in addition to] a social utility function." They observe that "a tariff policy. .. [is] ... equivalent to a production tax-cum-subsidy policy, plus consumption tax-cum-subsidy policy," and show that a production subsidy to the rural commodity increases employment and welfare. Furthermore, in their discussion of tommercial policy in a large, open economy, Srinivasan and Bhagwati [33] present the result that27 'A tariff (or trade subsidy) policy may not improve 26See the two paragraphs on tariffs on page 75 of their paper. 27See Theorem 9 on page 361. welfare but can improve employment." In this paper we have limited ourselves to a small, economy and in the context of the Bhagwati-Srinivasan work, our principal contribution lies in bringing dynamic stability conditions to the fore (see Proposition 4.4.2) and in showing the sensitivity of the results to the commodity being imported. This is particularly so when urban unemployment is the sole determinant of welfare (see Proposition 4.3.1). Hazari's [17] chapter is primarily concerned with wage subsidies but he does recognize thae!l "there [may] exist trade -off possibilities between welfare-and employment" and that "free trade is not the optimal policy." However, like most of the literature, Hazari is concerned with first best outcomes and does not investigate the desirability of trade in a second best setting.
Both Stiglitz and Calvo assume international prices to be unity in their papers and do not concern themselves with the issues discussed here. It should be emphasized, though, that in the context of the welfare function U, the behaviour of Calvo's model is identical to that of the HOS or Ricardo-Viner models; see Remarks 3.4.3, 3.4.5, 3.4.8, 4.4.1 and 4.4 .3. Stiglitz measures welfare net of the costs of turnover, Le., the GNP is measured by p X + P x u -or q (X)L where q (X)is the quit-rate r r u J, u and §is the training-cost parameter. Since this can be rewritten as PrXr + PuXu -!fr (X)~, we have a special case of a more general welfare function 1/1 (U,W).
The interested reader can develop for himself an analysis of such a function using the formulae and methods developed above. Finally, the reader can usefully compare our formulae for the sub-optimal tariffs with those developed by Kemp [20] . Kemp considers the case when the distortion is givenby a tax on the production of the exported commodity. Table 1 Gainsfrom Trade in Terms of W Table 2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Improvement in Terms of Trade to Improve U 6. SUMMARYAND CONCLUDINGREMARKS In 1971, H. Singer [32] wrote, "As an economist I am bound to say that the main avenue along which one would look for a major contribution to the solution of the unemployment problem in developing countries lies in trade. .. One cannot help being impressed by the vast potential improvement in the employment future of the developing countries which expanded trade could produce." Our Propositions 3.3.1 and 4.3.1, summarized in Table 1 , formalize these statements and show their independence of urban, labour market conditions and intersectoral mobility of capital. However, the results are sensitive to the commodity being imported (fortunately, in the direction casual empiricism suggests) and to stability conditions in the factor market.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize our results pertaining to the welfare function U. In this case, clear-cut results are much harder to come by and labour-market conditions, ew' eX and eR' and the relative size of the import sector, 'Y rand 'Y u' play a more prominent role.
We have not investigated the questions of gains from trade when the sufficient conditions in Propositions 3.3.1 and 4.3.1 do not hold. It should be a simple but tedious matter to provide a more complete taxonomy using our formulae and methods. It is doubtful whether this would add any further insight.
In conclusion, it is worth reiterating that the generalizedHarris-Todaro model is of interest primarily because by analyzingit, we analyze severalmodels all at once. It enables one to study a variety of labour market conditions all under one roof, so to speak. However, a synthesis can be pushed too far and there does come a point beyond which the economics of the different settings call for separate analyses. This 28See pages 135-36 of his book.
Intersectorally Mobile
Intersectorally Table 3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of aU-improving Tarifffrom an Initial Position of Laissez-Faire is particularly so for normative questions where the choice of the objective is of importance. However, it is also worth stressing that the model can be studied in its own right rather than as a synthesis and with qualitative information on its crucial parameters eA' ew and eR obtained from a straight-forward econometric estimation of the urban wage equation. In either case it is our hope that the results of this paper show that the analysis of the generalized Harris-Todaro model in the context of sub-optimal tariff policy does yield a position return.
